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The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts 
Return to the Prior Practice of Granting 
Injunctions for Patent Infringement 
By Stacy Streur 
¶1 The 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.1  marked a 
significant shift in how courts evaluate whether a patent holder, after proving 
infringement, is entitled to permanent injunctive relief.  A close study of the cases, 
though, reveals that there has not been a corresponding shift in the outcome of those 
decisions.  Prior to eBay, there was a general rule that upon proof of patent infringement, 
and “absent exceptional circumstances,”2
¶2 In response to eBay there was an immediate spike in the number of decisions in 
which a patent holder’s request for permanent injunctive relief was denied.  Since the 
essence of a patent holder’s rights is the right to exclude, commentators, at the time, 
expressed concern that the patent system’s ability to achieve its primary objective, to 
promote innovation, was in jeopardy.
 a permanent injunction would issue.  The eBay 
Court held that in patent cases, as in all other cases, an injunction should issue only after 
analyzing the facts of the case in light of the four-factor test for equitable relief.  
3  Others observed that “the power (and, therefore, 
value) of patents has been diminished.”4
¶3  Several years later, it is clear that injunctions are still granted in the majority of 
cases.  In the three years since the eBay decision, there have been sixty-eight district 
court decisions considering whether permanent injunctive relief should be granted in a 
patent infringement action.
 
5  In sixteen of those cases, the plaintiff’s request for an 
injunction was denied.6  In fifty-two of those cases the request for an injunction was 
granted.7
 
1 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
2 Id. at 391. 
  Insofar as the right to exclude is not fully protected without a corresponding 
3 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the 
Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 168 (2008) 
(“Removing the grant of property rights would not bring about an end to research and development 
activities.  However, it would certainly reduce such activities. Investments in some research and 
development activities would decrease, particularly in technology areas such as pharmaceutical 
development, where large financial investments are required and the resulting product is incapable of being 
protected as a trade secret.”); Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in 
High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, at 7, Dec. 3, 2007, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019611 (“Certainly strategies deliberately aimed at creating holdup should not be 
tolerated. But in attempting to reduce what appears to be a fairly narrow problem we must be careful to 
avoid the very real danger of under-compensating innovation and, in the process, reducing the incentives to 
create more of it.”). 
4 Douglas Ellis, The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive 
Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 439 (2008). 
5 See Chart of Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Patent Cases, infra.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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right to an injunction, the cases denying injunctions are significant and many articles 
have been written about those cases.  Interestingly though, a lot can be learned about the 
scope of equitable relief by considering the cases in which injunctions have been granted.   
¶4 In most of the post-eBay cases in which an injunction was granted, the court 
described the parties as competitors.  In comparison, when the injunction was denied, the 
patent holder was described as a non-practicing entity instead of being described as a 
competitor.  This pattern predominated despite the eBay court’s warning against 
categorical rules.8
¶5 In an attempt to explain this trend of granting injunctions based on whether the 
parties were competitors, commentators theorized that rather than following the directive 
set out in the eBay majority opinion, courts were following the Kennedy concurrence.
  
9  In 
2007, John Golden described the decisions denying injunctive relief as being “in apparent 
lockstep [with] Justice Kennedy’s concerns about trolls.”10
¶6 In this article, I will evaluate the post-eBay patent cases,
  But is that trend still true 
today? What are the implications of the district courts’ (and Federal Circuit’s) post-eBay 
decisions on the issue of injunctive relief?  Is the “concern about trolls” directing the 
outcome of recent cases, or are other factors, like competition between the parties, 
driving the decisions on the issue of equitable relief?  After eBay, was there an initial 
spike in favor of rulings denying injunctive relief in patent infringement cases followed 
by a slide back to the historic practice of granting injunctions? 
11 with a dual focus on the 
issue of “competition between the parties” and the period of time after eBay in which the 
case was decided.  This analysis demonstrates that, over time, there has been a 
progressively broader interpretation of what constitutes “competition between the 
parties” and a correspondingly broader view of what constitutes “irreparable harm” and 
“no adequate remedy at law.”12
 
8 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). (“Most notably, [the district court] 
concluded that a plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents and its lack of commercial activity in 
practicing the patents would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable 
harm if an injunction did not issue. . . .  But traditional equitable principles do not permit such broad 
classifications. . . .  To the extent that the District Court adopted such a categorical rule, then, its analysis 
cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.” (internal quotes and citations 
omitted)). 
9 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, in COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Toshiko Takenaka & Rainer Moufang eds., Edward Elgar 2008) (forthcoming 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086142 (“The courts all go through the four-factor analysis in 
an attempt to stay true to the holding in eBay.  But the practical effect is that this single fact—lack of 
commercialization—dictates the result in most cases.  This demonstrates a heavy reliance on Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence and potentially ignores the specific instruction in the majority opinion that such 
facts should not, by themselves, control the discretionary inquiry.”); see also Denicolò et al., supra note 3, 
at 3 (“Instead of following the majority prescription, however, many district courts faced with injunction 
decisions in the wake of eBay appear to be focused on the minority opinion of Justice Kennedy.”). 
10 John M. Golden, Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2007). 
11 This review is limited to patent cases decided between May 2006 and August 2009 that cite the 
Supreme Court decision eBay, and in which the patent holder, after proving infringement, sought 
permanent injunctive relief. 
12 The cases are organized by the year that the decision on injunctive relief was issued.  When there is 
both a district court decision and a Federal Circuit decision I used the date of the district court decision 
unless the Federal Circuit decision reversed the district court on the issue of injunctive relief, in which case, 
I used the date of the Federal Circuit decision. 
  I propose that the spike in post-eBay cases denying 
equitable relief based on the patent holder’s failure to demonstrate irreparable harm was a 
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blip, similar to the pattern of decisions issued after the Federal Circuit’s Phillips13
¶7 Part I describes the Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
 
decision.  Several years later, it appears that courts are returning to an interpretation of 
the law more consistent with the prior practice of generally granting injunctions once a 
patent holder proves infringement. 
14
I. EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE AND CRITERA FOR GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
  
Part II discusses the term “competitor” in the context of patentees seeking injunctive 
relief.  Part III describes the cases in which courts have granted injunctive relief, focusing 
on the time period when the case was decided and the issues of irreparable harm, 
inadequate remedy at law and competition between the parties.  Part IV describes the 
cases denying injunctive relief, focusing on the time period in which it was decided and 
the court’s reasoning for denying equitable relief.  Part V identifies and describes the 
current trend of generally granting injunctions once the patent holder proves 
infringement. 
¶8  Prior to the Supreme Court decision in eBay,15 a finding of patent infringement 
routinely resulted in an award of permanent injunctive relief.16  The theory behind this 
practice was that the patent gave the holder a right to exclude; therefore, the only 
appropriate remedy was an injunction.17
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a 
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such 
relief.  A plaintiff must demonstrate:  (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; 
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
  In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the implied 
assumption that patent cases should be treated differently than other cases and reaffirmed 
the general principle that an award of equitable relief in a patent case, as in any other, is 
subject to an analysis of the facts of the case in light of the elements of the traditional 
four-factor test: 
18
¶9 In eBay, MercExchange owned various patents on methods for conducting on-line 
sales, including U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (“the ‘265 patent”).  eBay operated (and still 
operates) a popular website for conducting on-line sales.  MercExchange attempted to 
 
 
13 Phillips v. AWH. Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim 
Construction Jurisprudence 19-22 (Apr. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Journal). 
14 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
15 Id. 
16 Ellis, supra note 4, at 439. 
17 George M. Newcombe et al., Practitioner Note: Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-
eBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 550 (2008). (“Because a patent offers its owner the right to exclude 
others from practicing a claimed invention, historically, a patentee received a permanent injunction as a 
matter of course when another party was found to infringe a valid patent.”). 
18 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
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negotiate a license with eBay for the use of its patented technology but the negotiations 
failed.19  Later, MercExchange sued eBay (and others) for patent infringement and the 
jury found the ‘265 patent valid and infringed by eBay.20  The district court, after 
considering the four-factor test, denied injunctive relief.21  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court decision, seeing “no reason to depart from the general rule that 
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances.”22
¶10 The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s holding that injunctive relief 
should be granted as a general rule upon a finding of infringement.
 
23
Although the District Court recited the traditional four-factor test . . . it appeared 
to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not 
issue in a broad swath of cases.  Most notably, it concluded that a “plaintiff’s 
willingness to license its patents” and “its lack of commercial activity in 
practicing the patents” would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder 
would not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue. . . .  But 
traditional equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications.
  The Court also 
rejected the District Court’s method of applying the traditional four-factor test: 
24
¶11 In addition to Justice Thomas’ majority opinion, there were two concurring 
opinions.  Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence emphasized the historic practice of granting 
injunctions in the “vast majority of patent cases,”
 
25 and opined that courts today should 
continue to evaluate patent infringement cases in accordance with long established 
precedent.26  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence27 agreed that “history may be instructive,”28
[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . 
. .  For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising 
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees 
to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. . . .  When the 
patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement  and an injunction may not serve the public interest.
 
but raised the concerns that 
29
 
19 Id. at 390. 
20 Id. at 390-91. 
21 Id. at 391. 
22 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
23 Id. 
24 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. 
25 Id. at 395 (Roberts, J., concurring).  
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 395-97. 
28 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
29 Id. at 396-97. 
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II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPETITION BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
¶12 In evaluating the first two prongs of the four-factor test for equitable relief, whether 
the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction does not issue and whether there 
is an adequate remedy at law, the post-eBay courts have relied heavily on the degree of 
competition between the parties.30
The eBay court specifically cautioned against the application of categorical rules, 
classifications and assumptions in these analyses. . . .  Nevertheless, courts, 
presumably struggling to balance the absence of a presumption of irreparable 
harm with a patentee’s right to exclude, have frequently focused upon the nature 
of the competition between plaintiff and defendant in the relevant market in the 
context of evaluating irreparable harm and the adequacy of money damages.
  As stated in TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 
31
If the parties can fairly be described as direct competitors, the first two factors will weigh 
heavily in favor of the plaintiff, and absent a compelling hardship or a public interest 
concern, an injunction will issue.
 
32  According to one commentator, “the emerging 
general rule appears to be that a patentee who competes in the market with the adjudged 
infringer will likely be awarded a permanent injunction while a patentee who does not 
compete with the infringer, but merely licenses its intellectual property, will likely not be 
awarded a permanent injunction.”33  The Federal Circuit has gone so far as to say that, 
“the essential attribute of a patent grant is that it provides a right to exclude competitors 
from infringing the patent.”34  In fact, the patent statute explicitly confers on patent 
holders the right to exclude.35
¶13 Some experts question the emphasis on whether the parties are competitors in the 
marketplace, and the view that injury to a competitor is irreparable.  They ask why, for 




30 TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 531 (D. Del. 2008) (permanent injunction 
granted). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (“Courts awarding permanent injunctions typically do so under circumstances where plaintiff 
practices its invention and is a direct market competitor.”). 
33 Newcombe, supra note 17, at 559. 
34 Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).  The court 
went on to note that “[i]n view of that right, infringement may cause a patentee irreparable harm not 
remediable by a reasonable royalty.” Id. 
35 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to 
the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”) 
(emphasis added). 
36 Ellis, supra note 4, at 446 (“Normal business losses, however, are not per se incalculable. In fact, 
there is a whole industry of economists, financial analysts and accountants who regularly calculate damages 
associated with lost sales, loss of market share and lost profits, for example. And courts regularly accept 
these calculations. Many of these same calculations are used in the business world to forecast or predict 
various performance metrics and to value assets, liabilities, projects and other potential investment 
opportunities--billions of dollars are spent on the basis of these types of calculations. Done carefully, these 
calculations can be reliable. The fact that the impact of the loss of an asset may be challenging to estimate 
does not mean it is impossible.”). 
  Since determining who qualifies for 
an injunction depends largely on how the court views the competitive relationship 
between the parties, defining the term competitor would add predictability to patent 
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litigation and clarify the scope of the injunctive relief.  However, little discussion exists 
in the case law about what constitutes “competition between the parties.” 
¶14  In an unusually explicit opinion, the court in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.37 
expressly addressed the issue of competition and identified two distinct types of 
“competition between the parties.”  With regard to certain infringed patents, Broadcom 
and Qualcomm both offered the products embodying the patent.  Both shared the same 
customers, and thus were in direct competition (“product competition”).  With regard to 
certain other infringed patents, Broadcom was not offering a product that embodied the 
patented technology, but the court nonetheless considered the parties competitors: “That 
Broadcom does not currently offer plug-for-plug replacements for Qualcomm’s CDMA 
chips may affect the degree of competition, but it does not change the fact that both firms 
compete in the same market”38
¶15 In analyzing the issue of irreparable harm with regard to market competition, the 
court noted that “one need not necessarily be a direct competitor in order to secure an 
injunction. . . .  In addition, there is injury to Broadcom’s right to enforce its exclusionary 
right to manage its patent portfolio in accordance with its chosen strategy.”
 (“market competition”). 
39
III. POST-EBAY CASES GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BASED ON IRREPARABLE INJURY AND 
NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW 
 
¶16 Prior to the decision in eBay, lower courts considering granting equitable relief 
often held that proof of infringement gave rise to a presumption of irreparable harm and 
no adequate remedy at law.40  In fact, some courts believed that it was an irrebuttable 
presumption.41  The eBay decision requires that courts evaluating whether to grant a 
permanent injunction provide a factual and legal analysis for each of the prongs of the 
traditional four-factor test for equitable relief.42
 
37 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. SACV 05-467 JVS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *5-27 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (granting permanent injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 
683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
38 Id. at *9. 
39 Id. at 16 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1988); MGM Well 
Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Systems, LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 378-79 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Novozymes A/S v. 
Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 612 (D. Del. 2007)). 
40 Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86953,at *2-14 
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008) (“Before eBay, the irreparable injury prong of the four-factor test was ‘presumed’ 
to be met following a ‘clear showing’ of patent validity and infringement.”). 
  Courts must separately analyze whether 
the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue, and whether an 
adequate remedy at law exists.  Consequently, the opinions are detailed but, due to the 
inherent overlap between the facts that courts rely on to show irreparable harm and the 
41 See Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s 
Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204, 209-10 (2009) (“In any event, the eBay 
petitioner and many amici who urged the Court to hear the appeal effectively characterized the case so as to 
arouse the Court’s ire against the Federal Circuit and the latter’s view that proving infringement created a 
virtually irrebuttable presumption that an injunction would issue.  And the strategy worked.”). 
42 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  But see Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. 
CV-96-5658, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73366 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006) (conducting cursory review of the 
four equitable factors, relying primarily on general notions of equity and fairness as well as the public 
interest in finding that an injunction should issue); Mannatech, Inc. v. Glycoproducts Int’l, Inc., No. 3-06-
CV-0471-BD, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52537 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2008) (injunctive relief summarily granted 
after defendant presented no opposition to request). 
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facts that courts rely on to show no adequate remedy at law, the decisions are sometimes 
awkward.  Some district court judges have expressly acknowledged the overlap.43  In 
Smith & Nephew44 the court opined that “[a]lthough stated as two separate factors under 
eBay, the irreparable harm requirement contemplates the inadequacy of alternate 
remedies available to the plaintiff.”45  Another district court noted that, “by definition 
irreparable injury is that for which compensatory damages are unsuitable.”46
¶17 In the first twelve months after eBay (May 2006 through April 2007) there were 
twenty patent cases granting permanent injunctive relief.
  Thus, 
throughout this paper, the first and second factors of the four-factor test are frequently 
addressed together.   
47  In the second twelve months 
(May 2007 through April 2008), there were thirteen decisions granting permanent 
injunctive relief.48
 
43 Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“for the 
same reasons [that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm,] remedies available at law are not adequate 
to compensate Funai for Daewoo’s infringement”); Trading Techs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86953, at *2-14 
(“Consideration of [whether there is an adequate remedy at law] overlaps considerably with that of 
irreparable injury, in that an inadequate remedy at law can cause irreparable harm.”); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197,1219 (2007) (“[T]he requisite analysis for the 
second factor of the four-factor test inevitably overlaps with that of the first.”). 
44 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (granting 
permanent injunction). 
45 Id. at 982-83. 
46 Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-463, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30338, at *5 (E.D. 
Tex. Apr. 11, 2008) (quoting Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
47 Cases granting injunctive relief between May 2006 and April 2007: Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield 
Servs., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006); KEG Techs., Inc. 
v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., No. 01-00578, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59212 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006); Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg. Inc., No. 04-
5120, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2006); Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 
No. 4:04CV00485, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60575 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2006), aff’d, 523 F.3d 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in relevant 
part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-
1781, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70263 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. CV-96-
5658, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73366 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 
466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2006), appeal dismissed, No. 2007-1048, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4889 
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2008); Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 86990 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 260 F. App’x 284 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (vacated and remanded on issue of claim construction); Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 
2006); Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 19, 2006); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, remanded, 258 F. App’x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (narrowing scope of injunction); Atlanta 
Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-1071-ODE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96872 (N.D. Ga. 
Feb. 23, 2007), rev’d and remanded, 516 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (remanded on issue of validity); 
Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond 
Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 2-04-CV-32, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25948 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007), 
vacated and remanded, 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacated and remanded on the issue of 
infringement); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., Nos. 04-1689, 06-757, 06-5166, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19494 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007), aff’d by, 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MGM Well Servs., 
Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Secs., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, vacated in part, 539 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed on issue of infringement; injunction 
vacated). 
  In the most recent twelve-month period (May 2008 through April 
48 Cases granting injunctive relief between May 2007 and April 2008: Commonwealth Scientific & 
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2009), there were fifteen cases granting permanent injunctive relief.49
¶18 In the first twelve months after eBay, courts relied heavily on direct competition 
between the parties in granting equitable relief.
  In most of these 
post-eBay decisions granting injunctive relief, the parties were described as competitors, 
with the concept of competition growing broader over time.  
50  The holding in Visto Corp. v. Seven 
Networks, Inc.51
 
Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Brooktrout, Inc. v. 
Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43107 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007); Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Pa. 2007), rev’d, vacated, 532 F.3d 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed and vacated on validity and infringement); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope 
Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 578 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d and remanded, 543 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed 
and remanded on issue of infringement); Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co., 509 F. Supp. 2d 795 (D. 
Minn. 2007); Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70776, at *2-10 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2007) (perm. inj. granted) Fed. Cir. rev’d denial of def’s. motion for 
new trial, Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Verizon Servs. Corp. v. 
Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310-14 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (aff’g injunction at to certain claims and 
rev’g injunction as to certain claims); Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D. 
Del. 2007) (perm. inj. granted); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No.  SACV 05-467 JVS (RNBx), 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *5-27 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (district court’s reasoning for granting 
permanent injunction); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. SACV05-0467-JVS (RNBx), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 105232 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2008) (order entered permanent injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, remanded, 543 F.3d 683, (Fed. Cir. 2008) (partially affirming permanent injunction); Power-One, Inc. 
v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30338, at *2-6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2008) (perm. inj. 
granted); Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79689, at*5-21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) (perm. inj. granted); Acumed LLC v. Stryker, Corp., 551 
F.3d 1323, 1327-31 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’g, Acumed, LLC v. Stryker Corp., 04-CV-513-BR, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 86866, at *5-20 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007) (perm. inj. granted). 
49 Cases granting injunctive relief between May 2008 and April 2009: Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86953 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008); TruePosition Inc. v. 
Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008), amended by 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9946 (D. Del. Jan. 
26, 2009); Emory Univ. v. Nova BioGenetics, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0141-TWT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
57642 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2008); Mannatech, Inc. v. Glycoproducts Int’l, Inc., NO. 3-06-CV-0471-BD, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52537 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2008); Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. 
05-12237-WGY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77343 (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2008), aff’d, 296 F. App’x 69 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, No. 02-1694 GMS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87623 (D. Del. Oct. 29, 2008); Sensormatic Elecs. Corp. v. Tag Co. US, LLC, No. 06-81105-CIV, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102690 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2008); Extreme Networks, Inc. v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 
No. 07-cv-229-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88540 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2008); Callaway Golf Co. v. 
Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Del. 2008); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor 
Int’l, Inc., No. 04-1371-JJF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100539 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2008); U.S. Philips Corp. v. 
Iwasaki Elec. Co., Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 2d 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. 
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-
5172, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2009); Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Res., Nos. 
05-00679-BMK, 05-00787-BMK, 06-00182-BMK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26216 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 
2009); Mass Engineered Design, Inc., v. Ergotron, Inc., No. 2:06 CV 272, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34173 
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2009). 
50 See, e.g., Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg. Inc., No. 04-5120, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872, at *1-
27 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2006) (granting permanent injunction; parties were direct competitors in 
snowmobile trailer market); Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485 ERW, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 60575, at *30-33 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2006) (granting permanent injunction; irreparable injury 
because “potential customers in the United States were buying infringing devices sold and imported by 
defendant, instead of purchasing the products sold by plaintiffs”); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 
446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting permanent injunction; parties were direct competitors 
in the DVR market and plaintiff suffered loss of market share). 
51 Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 19, 2006) (granting permanent injunction). 
 is representative of those cases.  In Visto, the parties were direct 
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competitors in the mobile email market.  The Visto court, citing Tivo52 and finding 
irreparable injury, held, “[t]he parties to this case are direct competitors, and this fact 
weighs heavily in the court’s analysis.  Intellectual property enjoys its highest value when 
it is asserted against a direct competitor in the plaintiff’s market.”53  Judge Folsom found 
irreparable harm because “the availability of the infringing products leads to loss of 
market share for Plaintiff’s products.”54  Additionally, during this period (May 2006 
through April 2007), as reflected in TransOcean,55  a finding of direct competition 
between the parties, in the form of shared customers,56 generally resulted in an expansive 
definition of “inadequate remedy at law”:  “The court is persuaded that if it does not enter 
a permanent injunction, it will force a compulsory license on Transocean that will not 
contain any of the commercial business terms typically used by a patent holder to control 
its technology or limit encroachment on its market share.”57  Rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the Kennedy concurrence in eBay should be interpreted to prohibit the 
issuance of an injunction, the court reasoned that the portion of the Kennedy concurrence 
relating to licensing and component parts is strictly limited to situations in which the 
plaintiff was willing to license and the technology was but a small component of the 
defendants product.58
Although future damages may compensate Visto for an approximate loss, that 
does not make them adequate in the sense that they are a suitable proxy for 
injunctive relief.  What makes legal remedies inadequate under the circumstances 
of this case is the inability to calculate the plaintiff’s future losses with precision.  
An injunction against the continued use of the plaintiff’s intellectual property is 
the proper remedy to prevent future infringement.
  The Visto court offered a similarly broad reading of what 
constitutes lack of an adequate remedy at law when the parties are competing for the 
same customers:  
59
¶19 Towards the end of the first twelve month period after eBay, the District of 
Delaware seemed to expand the definition of what constitutes “competition between the 
parties” when it granted injunctive relief in Novozymes.
 
60  In that case, the patentee had a 
non-exclusive license with one of its subsidiaries that was practicing the patent.  The 
plaintiff sought to join its subsidiary as a co-plaintiff, but the court held that the 
subsidiary did not have standing because its license was non-exclusive.  Nonetheless, the 
court held that Novozymes, the licensor/patent-holder, and defendant, the infringer, were 
“head-to-head competitors.”61
 
52 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting permanent 
injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (injunction affirmed). 
53 Visto Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453, at *12 (citing TiVo Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d at 669). 
54 Id. 
55 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 93408, at *3-26 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (granting permanent injunction). 
56 Id. at *12 (injunction necessary because parties shared customers in the “deep water oil rig” market). 
57 Id. at *19. 
58 Id. 
59 Visto Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453, at *13 (emphasis in original). 
60 Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 613 (D. Del. 2007) (granting permanent 
injunction). 
61 Id. at 612. 
  The court further commented that “even though 
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Novozymes does not market the alpha-amaylases itself, it has suffered harm beyond the 
reasonable royalty that it can recover from Defendants[, and] Novozymes will continue to 
suffer such irreparable harm if Defendants are not enjoined.”62  The court also noted that 
“Novozymes has a right, granted by Congress, not to assist its rival with the use of 
proprietary technology.”63  The defendant argued that under eBay, the loss of the right to 
exclude could not be irreparable harm, but the court disagreed.  It reasoned that 
“[c]ontrary to Genencor’s argument . . . the Supreme Court in eBay did not state that loss 
of the right to exclude could not be irreparable harm.  Rather, the Court simply rejected 
the proposition that the patentee’s right to exclude should always lead to injunctive relief 
for patent infringement.”64  In addition, toward the end of the first year post-eBay, the 
court in MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc.65 felt that the public interest invariably 
supports an injunction.66
¶20 Through the next twelve-month post-eBay period (May 2007 through April 2008), 
the courts’ views of what constituted sufficient evidence of irreparable harm expanded.  
However, direct competition between the parties remained the principle basis for granting 
injunctive relief.  As the court noted in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
 
67 “[p]laintiff 
and defendants are direct competitors in a two-supplier market.  If plaintiff cannot 
prevent its only competitor’s continued infringement of its patent, the patent is of little 
value.”68  In Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp.,69 the court noted that the 
defendant’s product “competes directly with the Plaintiffs’ product.”70  “In fact, it is the 
only competition and thus, its sale reduces the Plaintiffs’ market share.  Continued sales 
by [the defendant] will irreparably harm the Plaintiffs.”71  In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. 
Nutrinova Inc.,72 the court concluded that “Lonza is Martek’s only competitor in the 
vegetarian DHA market for adult foods and beverages, and is targeting Martek’s 
customers in that industry [and] if Lonza is not enjoined from infringing the ‘594 and 
‘281 patents, [Martek] is likely to lose market share that it may not be able to 
recapture.”73  In Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp.,74
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 613. 
64 Id. at 612. 
65 MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, remanded, Nos. 2007-1183, -1204, -1238, 258 F. App’x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
66 Id. at 420 (“There is a general public interest in favor of strong patent protection, except in cases 
where an obvious public interest such as public health and safety exists.”). 
67 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (granting permanent 
injunction), vacated, 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversing on validity and infringement). 
68 Id. at 482. 
69 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 578 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d and remanded, 
543 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed and remanded on issue of infringement). 
70 Id. at 586. 
71 Id.  
72 Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D. Del. 2007) (granting permanent 
injunction).  
73 Id. at 558. 
74Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43107 (E.D. Tex. 
June 14, 2007). 
  U.S. District Judge T. John 
Ward concluded that the parties were direct competitors in the fax server board market 
and granted injunctive relief, citing the plaintiff’s loss of market share as a basis for 
finding irreparable harm: 
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Additionally, although future damages in lieu of an injunction may compensate 
Brooktrout for an approximate loss, that does not make future damages adequate 
in the sense that they are a suitable proxy for injunctive relief.  The inability to 
calculate the plaintiff’s future loss with reasonable precision makes legal 
remedies inadequate in this case.  An injunction against future acts of inducement 
is the proper remedy to prevent future infringement.75




¶21 During this second year after eBay (May 2007 through April 2008), a district court 
granted the first post-eBay permanent injunction in favor of a non-practicing entity in 
Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation.
 
77  In that case, the 
plaintiff was described as the Australian equivalent of the National Institute of Health, 
and its activities included developing technology that could be used to create start-up 
companies and/or for licensing to firms to earn commercial royalties.  The court stated 
that the parties were not competitors, but found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable 
harm without an injunction.  The court reasoned that the inability to enforce the patent 
against one infringer significantly increased the risk that other parties would be willing to 
risk infringing the patented technology.  Discussing the Kennedy concurrence in eBay, 
the Commonwealth Scientific court specifically concluded that “[t]his case is not the 
situation that concerned Justice Kennedy; Buffalo’s infringing use of CSIRO’s 
technology is not limited to a minor component of the technology.  The ‘069 patent is the 
core technology embodied in [patents].”78
¶22 Nearly two years after eBay one district court further and expanded the post-eBay 
scope of irreparable harm.  In Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.,
 
79 the plaintiff sued 
Baxter for declaratory judgment.  The court acknowledged the economic value of the 
right to exclude and stated that “[w]ithout the right to obtain an injunction, the right to 
exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to 
have, and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and 
technological research.”80  The Fresenius court further stated that “the loss of goodwill, 
reputation for innovation, the legal right to exclude, including the right to control the 
terms of any licensing arrangement, are all forms of irreparable injury that cannot be 
easily and readily quantified through a simple monetary award.”81
¶23 During the most recent twelve-month post-eBay period, (May 2008 through April 
2009) direct competition between the parties continued to be the principle basis for courts 




75 Id. at *4-5 (emphasis in original). 
76 Id. at *5. 
77 Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. 
Tex. 2007) (granting permanent injunction). 
78 Id. at 606. 
79 Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
79689 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) (granting permanent injunction). 
80 Id. at *8 (quoting Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
81 Id. at *13-14. 
 but the scope of what qualified 
as “competition between the parties” and “irreparable harm” continued to grow. 
82 See, e.g., TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008) (granting permanent 
injunction because parties were direct competitors); Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. 05-
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¶24 In Trading Technologies International, Inc.,83 the court explained why the loss of 
market share is an irreparable injury.  According to the Trading Technologies court, 
market share is one of the patent holder’s most valuable assets.  “Erosion of this 
intangible asset would cause incalculable extraneous injury to [Trading Technologies’] 
business.  Therefore, the continuing existence of eSpeed’s infringing products in the same 
marketplace . . . poses a risk of irreparable harm to [Trading Technologies].”84
¶25 In October 2008, the Amgen
 
85 court identified an injury not discussed in previous 
cases.  The court concluded that without an injunction, the value of the Amgen’s stock 
would be in jeopardy.  According to the court, loss of value of its stock would result in 
loss of investment capital to pursue research and development.86
¶26 In November 2008, the court in Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co.
  In addition, the Amgen 
court recognized the risk that allowing the defendant to continue to infringe would invite 
other infringers and likely result in significant legal fees to enforce the patent. 
87 further 
expanded the definition of “competition,” and hence, the scope of granting injunctive 
relief.  Despite the fact that there were multiple competitors in the three-layer golf ball 
market, the court found sufficient evidence that plaintiff suffered irreparable harm.  
According to the court, “[a] credible case can be made that, had defendant not launched 
the Pro V1® ball in late 2000, a large number of its tour players may have switched to 
the Rule 35® ball in January 2001.”88  In addition, the Callaway court rejected the notion 
that a party’s willingness to license was a sufficient basis to prove that monetary damages 
would be an adequate remedy.89
Although plaintiff’s willingness to forgo its patent rights (generally) for 
compensation may be inconsistent with the notion that money damages are 
inadequate, it is certainly not a dispositive factor. . . .  In this regard, of utmost 
  In Callaway, the plaintiff’s golf ball, that embodied the 
patented technology, also contained a second patented technology owned by the 
defendant and licensed to plaintiff in a cross-licensing arrangement.  The court held that 
monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy: 
 
12237-WGY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77343 (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2008), aff’d, 296 F. App’x 69 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (same); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 2d 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same). 
83 Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86953 (N.D. Ill. 
May 22, 2008). 
84 Id. at *7. 
85 Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. 05-12237-WGY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77343 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 2, 2008) (granting permanent injunction), aff’d, 296 F. App’x 69 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
86 Id. at *177-78 (“The Federal Circuit has long acknowledged the importance of the patent system in 
encouraging innovation.  Indeed, the encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose 
of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.  Importantly, the patent system provides 
incentive to the innovative drug companies to continue costly development efforts. The evidence in this 
case confirmed the Federal Circuit’s evaluation of the importance of the right to exclude as an incentive for 
investment.” (internal cites and quotations omitted)). 
87 Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Del. 2008) (granting permanent 
injunction). 
88 Id. at 621 (“It is impossible to tell whether, absent the Pro V1® ball, plaintiff would have gained the 
momentum . . . to become the market leader itself, or merely gained a more favorable position than it 
presently has. . . .  Plaintiff was already a market leader of golf equipment, and was poised to compete in 
the developing multi-layer ball market.  History cannot be rewritten such that plaintiff expanded its 
customer base and improved its market position . . . and/or reaped the benefits of good will and reputation 
associated with manufacturing the leading golf ball during this critical time period.”). 
89 Id. at 620. 
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import in the context of evaluating irreparable harm and the adequacy of money 
damages is the nature of the competition between plaintiff and defendant in the 
three-piece golf ball market.90
The essential attribute of a patent grant is that it provides a right to exclude 
competitors from infringing the patent.  35 U.S.C. s 154(a)(1)(2000).  In view of 
that right, infringement may cause a patentee irreparable harm not remediable by 
a reasonable royalty.  While the fact that a patentee has previously chosen to 
license the patent may indicate that a reasonable royalty does compensate for an 
infringement, that is but one factor for the district court to consider.  The fact of 
the grant of previous licenses, the identity of the past licensees, the experience in 
the market since the licenses were granted, and the identity of the new infringer 
all may affect the district court’s discretionary decision concerning whether a 
reasonable royalty from an infringer constitutes damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement.
 
In December 2008, the Federal Circuit offered its perspective on the issue of whether a 
patent holder’s willingness to license could be a basis for concluding that monetary 
damages would be an adequate remedy: 
91
In February 2009, a district court in New Jersey gave “irreparable harm” and 
“competition between the parties” perhaps their most expansive reading to date.
 
92  In 
Joyal Products, Inc, the plaintiff was a defunct business in the process of liquidating its 
assets.  It argued that the parties were competitors and that without an injunction against 
the defendant it would suffer irreparable harm because it would not be able to obtain the 
maximum value for the patented assets.  In granting the permanent injunction, the court 
reasoned that anything less than a permanent injunction would damage the value of the 
patent since the “principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude.”93
[A]s Joyal is no longer conducting business, it wishes to divest itself of this asset.  
It justifiably expects to be able to sell that asset for maximum value.  Joyal’s 
ability to obtain the maximum value from the sale - indeed, the very ability to sell 
the patent at all - will be materially impaired if Johnson is permitted to continue 
[to] produce and sell infringing products in the United States.
  The court 
went on to explain why there was no adequate remedy at law:  
94
IV. POST-EBAY CASES DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BASED ON IRREPARABLE HARM AND 
NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW ARE DIMINISHING 
 
¶27 In the first twelve months after eBay (May 2006 through April 2007), there were 
twenty-eight decisions addressing the issue of permanent injunctive relief.  Of those, 
eight (or twenty-nine percent) resulted in a denial of an injunction based on the patent 
 
90 Id. at 620. 
91 Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
92 Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 26, 2009) (granting permanent injunction). 
93 Id. at *31 (quoting Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
94Id. at *32-33. 
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holders failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.95  During the second twelve months 
(May 2007 through April 2008), there were sixteen decisions granting permanent 
injunctions with three resulting in denials, but none were based on the patent holders 
failure to demonstrate irreparable harm or no adequate remedy at law.96  In the most 
recent twelve-month period after eBay (May 2008 through April 2009), there were 
twenty permanent injunction decisions with five denials, but only two of those denials 
were primarily based on the patent holders failure to demonstrate irreparable harm (ten 
percent).97  The eight denial-of -injunction decisions from the first year post-eBay (May 
15, 2006 to May 15, 2007) were all based on the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that it 
would suffer irreparable harm in the event that an injunction did not issue.98
¶28 One of the early post-eBay denial cases was Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor 
Corporation.
 
99  In that case, the patented technology was a hybrid electric vehicle train, a 
component of the hybrid automobile engine, and the defendant’s hybrid automobile 
engine infringed.  The district court applied the four-factor test and found that Paice 
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.100
 
95 Eight denial-of -injunction decisions from the first year post-eBay (May 15, 2006 to May 15, 2007): 
z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D. Tex. 
July 7, 2006) aff’d in relevant part, 523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 
2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623 
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 158 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007) (denying permanent injunction), rev’d, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77728 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); IMX, Inc. v. 
Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440 
(D. Del. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (patentee withdrew 
request for injunction); Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. 8:03-CV-242, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96487 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 13, 2007) (dissolving permanent injunction), aff’d in relevant part, 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
96 Three denial-of-injunction cases from second year post-eBay (May 2006 to April 2007) Respironics, 
Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008); Innogenetics, 
N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3148 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 2007), rev’d in 
relevant part, 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (injunction vacated); Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, 
Ltd., No. 06-0162 MMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12183 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008).  Two of the three cases 
denying injunctive relief during this time period were based on the court’s determination that there was no 
likelihood of future infringement (Respironics and Nichia). 
97 Five denial-of-injunction cases from May 2008 through April 2009: Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 
Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008); Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. C 02-0790 SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98939 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008); Telcordia Techs., 
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Del. 2009); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 
F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., No. CV-
03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31328 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009).  Two of the three cases 
denying injunctive relief during this time period were decisions from the District of Delaware. 
98 Two of those decisions were issued without prejudice.  See IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. 
Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Del. 2007), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (patentee withdrew request for injunction).  But 
U.S. District Judge Robinson (the author of both decisions) later characterized those decisions as denials of 
injunction.  See TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 532 n.48 (D. Del. 2008) 
(describing IMX and Praxair as “declining to grant permanent injunction”). 
99 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
100 Id. at *12. 
  After considering the parties’ arguments, the 
district court decided that Toyota’s continued sale of its hybrid automobile (the allegedly 
infringing product) would not negatively impact Paice’s efforts to license its electric 
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vehicle train.  The court reasoned that since Paice does not manufacture automobiles, it 
was not at risk of losing name recognition or market share.101  The plaintiff (Paice) 
argued that without an injunction, it would suffer irreparable harm in that it would be 
unable successfully to license its patented technology.  In support of this claim, the 
plaintiff offered evidence of its failure to license the technology thus far.  The court 
rejected this argument, citing evidence in the record that plaintiff’s failure to license its 
technology may have resulted from misrepresentations and improper business tactics.102
¶29 As in Paice, the plaintiff in z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
 
103 was a non-
practicing entity and the patented technology was a component of the adjudged 
infringer’s final product.  Specifically, Microsoft’s Office and Windows software 
programs infringed the plaintiff’s product activation technology.  The court nevertheless 
denied injunctive relief, concluding that “Microsoft’s continued infringement does not 
inhibit z4’s ability to market, sell, or license its patented technology. . . .  Microsoft does 
not produce product activation software that it then individually sells, distributes, or 
licenses to other software manufacturers or consumers.”104
¶30 A third decision, issued during the first year post-eBay, in which the patent holder 
was denied injunctive relief based on his failure to demonstrate irreparable harm, was 
Amado v. Microsoft Corp.
  Here the plaintiff was a non-
practicing entity, but the fact that the infringed technology was a component of the 
defendant’s product was, again, arguably, equally significant. 
105
Amado does not compete with Microsoft, does not sell a product covered by the 
patent and is no longer even attempting to commercialize or license the patent.  
Moreover, Amado’s patent only covers a very small component of the infringing 
products - claim 21, the only claim that the jury found Microsoft Office and 
Access infringed, covers a single feature linking Access and Excel. . . . Thus, 
Amado’s injury can be adequately compensated through monetary damages.
  In Amado, the infringed patent was a point-and-click 
interface for linking database records and spreadsheets.  Microsoft incorporated the 
patented technology into its software programs.  That case was originally decided prior to 
eBay and the district court awarded Amado an injunction.  After the eBay decision, 
Microsoft requested reconsideration of the injunction, and the District Court held that 
under the dictates of eBay, plaintiff had not met his burden for establishing irreparable 
harm.  The permanent injunction was dissolved, with the court reasoning that: 
106
The Amado Court noted that the plaintiff was not in the business of selling a product 
covered by the patent, pointed out that the patent covered only a small component of the 





101 Id. at *14. 
102 Id. at *12-13. 
103 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying permanent 
injunction), aff’d, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
104 Id. at 440. 
105 Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
106 Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. 8:03-CV-242, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96487, at *38-39 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 13, 2007). 
107 Id. 
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¶31 Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd.,108 also decided during that first year 
post e-Bay, is notable because the court first denied an injunction, then granted it, leading 
some commentators to categorize this as an “injunction-granted” case.109
[I]t cannot be said that Sundance’s licensees are losing sales to DeMonte 
expressly because of its infringement of the segmented cover.  It is possible that 
lost sales are due to a desire for other features of the Quick Draw system or are 
sales lost to other competitors in the marketplace.  Sundance simply cannot tie 
alleged lost sales to the nature of DeMonte’s infringement.
  Sundance is 
also interesting because its reasoning and holding conflict with those of a significant 
number of subsequent decisions.  In Sundance, the patented technology was not a small 
component of the infringing product and the plaintiff argued that the infringing sales 
would damage his relationship with his licensees.  The court rejected that argument: 
110
Other district courts faced with similar facts have granted injunctive relief, finding that 
plaintiff and defendant were competitors with regard to the product or the market 
generally.
 
111  In November 2008, one court specifically rejected this strict requirement of 
proof, requiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate a “credible case” that there was 
irreparable injury and would continue to be.112
¶32 Discussing whether there was an adequate remedy at law, the court in Sundance 
noted that “Sundance licenses the ‘109 patent to others, and offered to license it to 
DeMonte prior to filing suit against it, thus demonstrating that money damages are 
adequate.  Their conduct against DeMonte and others . . . indicates an interest only in 
obtaining money damages against accused infringers.”
 
113  In other cases in which the 
plaintiff was willing to license, the court nonetheless held that money damages would not 
be an adequate remedy at law.114
 
108 Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158 (E.D. Mich. 
Jan. 4, 2007) (perm. inj. denied), rev’d, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77728 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007), rev’d on 
other grounds, 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
109 See, e.g., Newcombe et al., supra note 17, at 557-59 (“Since eBay, at least 30 permanent injunctions 
have issued.  In all but two of these cases, the infringer was a direct horizontal competitor plaintiff patentee 
[sic].  Conversely, in six of the seven cases where the patentee and infringer were not direct-horizontal 
competitors, the courts initially denied a permanent injunction.  Thus, the emerging general rule appears to 
be that a patentee who competes in the market with the adjudged infringer will likely be awarded a 
permanent injunction while a patentee who does not compete with the infringer, but merely licenses its 
intellectual property, will likely not be awarded a permanent injunction.”). 
110 Sundance, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158, at *8-9. 
111 See Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70776, at *2-10 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2007) (other competitors in the sports ball industry and other 
features that may have influenced customers’ purchasing decisions); Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 
585 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Del. 2008) (other competitors in the three layer golf ball industry and other 
features that may have influenced customers’ purchasing decisions); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
No. SACV 05-467 JVS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *5-27 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (granting 
permanent injunction because “one need not be a direct competitor to secure an injunction”), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
112 Callaway Golf, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
113 Sundance, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158, at *9.  
114 See, e.g., Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 612-13 (D. Del. 2007). 
  Interestingly, on reconsideration, the court, granted the 
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injunction; but rather than relying on irreparable harm, it relied on “changed 
circumstances,” which, according to the court, warranted the issuance of an injunction.115
¶33 Also during this first year post-eBay, the Western District of Oklahoma denied an 
injunction in Voda v. Cordis Corp.
 
116  The plaintiff was a licensor of certain patents 
which described an angioplasty guide catheter and the inventive technique for using the 
catheter to perform angioplasty.  According to the Voda court, “any harm would have 
been directed at plaintiff’s licensee, Scimed, not plaintiff.”117  “Moreover, other than the 
presumption of irreparable harm, plaintiff identifies no harm to himself; rather, he relies 
on alleged harm to a non-party, Scimed.”118  The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that 
its relationship with its exclusive licensee would be damaged: “[t]his argument . . . is 
simply the other side of the right-to-exclude coin and is not sufficient to justify granting 
injunctive relief.”119  This reasoning has been rejected by subsequent district court 
decisions.120
provides licensees with an opportunity to renegotiate their licensing terms if the 
terms of the initial deal were less favorable ex post than was expected ex ante.  
Simply put, if the terms turn out to be a favorable deal . . . then the licensee may 
join the patent holder in obtaining a permanent injunction against an infringer. . . 
.  If, however, the licensing terms turn out to be unfavorable for the licensee . . . 
then the exclusive licensee may refuse to join the suit . . . .
  Douglas Ellis aptly points out that prohibiting a patent holder, like the one 
in Voda, from obtaining an injunction unless its licensee joins the action 
121
¶34 In the next year (May 2007 to May 2008), there were three cases denying 
injunctive relief.  None of those denials was based on plaintiff’s failure to prove 
irreparable harm.  In Respironics
 
122 and Nichia,123 the denials were based on plaintiff’s 
failure to prove a likelihood of future infringement.  In Innogenetic,124
¶35 In the most recent year (May 2008 to April 2009), five cases denied injunctive 
relief: two from the District of Delaware, two from the Northern District of California, 
and one from Arizona.
 the court’s denial 
was based on the fact that the jury awarded a royalty which included a market entry fee; 
therefore, the defendant was entitled to continue to practice the invention. 
 125
 
115 Sundance, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158, at *4-9. 
116 Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *18-21 (W.D. Okla. 
Sept. 5, 2006). 
117 Id. at *12. 
118 Id., at *18-19. 
119 Id., at *20. 
120 Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 612-613 (D. Del. 2007) (perm. inj. 
granted, plaintiff was licensor and subsidiary was non-exclusive licensee). 
121 Ellis, supra note 4, at 460-61. 
122 Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 
2008). 
123 Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No. 06-0162 MMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12183 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 7, 2008). 
124 Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3148 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 
12, 2007), rev’d in relevant part, 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (injunction vacated). 
  Of those decisions, one was a case in which the patent holder 
125 Five denials of injunction from May 2008 through April 2009: Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. 
Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008); Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. C 02-0790 SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98939 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008); Telcordia Techs., 
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was seeking a compulsory license and not an injunction,126 and two were cases involving 
medical technology in which the public interest was a significant factor in the decision.127
¶36 In the court in Advanced Cardiovascular Systems
  
In the remaining two cases, the district courts found that the plaintiffs failed to show 
irreparable harm. 
128 (ACS) held that denial of the 
injunction would not cause the plaintiff irreparable harm.  After (1) scrutinizing the stent 
market, (2) detailing the relationship between the overall stent market, the bare metal 
stent market and the drug-eluting stent market, (3) discussing the role of other principal 
players in the stent market, and (4) citing Morgan Stanley’s estimates regarding predicted 
changes in market share, the court concluded that “[t]hough Medtronic appears to be 
gaining market momentum, it appears to be not only at the cost of ACS, clouding the 
relationship between Medtronic’s infringement and ACS’s losses.”129  Further, “ACS 
has[d]not identified any specific customers it has lost, or stands to lose, directly as a 
result of Medtronic’s continued sales of infringing stents.”130  On this basis, the court 
concluded that the issue of irreparable harm favored the defendant.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on Praxair131 and ignored other cases with multiple 
competitors in which the court found irreparable harm.  With regard to the issue of 
whether there was an adequate remedy at law, the court noted that because the plaintiff 
was willing to license its patents in the past, money damages should be adequate: 
“Money damages are rarely inadequate in these circumstances; rather, permanent 
injunctions are typically granted in two-competitor situations where the patentee has 
demonstrated an unwillingness to part with the exclusive right.”132  Again, this reasoning 
conflicts with the decisions of numerous other courts, which have held that future 
damages are difficult to quantify and therefore an injunction is the appropriate remedy.133
¶37 Notably, in support of the argument that injunctions are granted in two competitor 
situations, the court cited Novozymes.
 
134  However, in Novozymes, the patent holder did 
not practice the patent but licensed it to a subsidiary as part of a non-exclusive license.  
While the court refused to allow the licensee to join the suit because of the non-exclusive 
nature of the license agreement, it characterized the licensor (patent holder) and the 
defendant (infringer) as “head-to-head” competitors.135
 
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Del. 2009); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 
F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., No. CV-
03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31328 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009). 
126 Boston Scientific Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98939. 
127 Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 557-63; Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31328, at *15-31. 
128 Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d 554. 
129 Id. at 559. 
130 Id. at 560. 
131 Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Del. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
remanded, 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
132 Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 560. 
133 See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 984 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) 
(“Monetary damages generally are not an adequate remedy against future infringement.”), appeal 
dismissed, No. 2007-1048, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4889 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2008). 
134 Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007). 
135 Id. at 613. 
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¶38 Although the ACS court made a finding that the patent holder failed to show that, 
absent an injunction, it would suffer irreparable harm, the public interest factor may 
explain the court’s analysis.  According to the court, there is a strong public interest in 
maintaining diversity in the coronary stent market and there was evidence in the record 
that some physicians preferred the defendant’s stent.136
¶39 Telcordia Technologies, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
 
137 is one of four denial-of-
injunction decisions issued by the District of Delaware since the decision in eBay.138  The 
patented technology in that case related to telecommunications networks.  The patentee-
plaintiff derived revenue from licensing the technology and the court held that it failed to 
provide evidence of irreparable harm “such as lost sales, licensing, or research and 
development opportunities.”139  The court stated that “[i]nfringing one’s right to exclude, 
alone, is insufficient to warrant injunctive relief.”140  The court rejected Telcordia’s 
argument that its “leverage in the market will be harmed if it cannot advise potential 
licensees that infringement of its patents can result in a permanent injunction.”141  The 
court called that claim “nothing more than attorney argument.”142
¶40 On February 23, 2009, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
denied equitable relief to a successful patent plaintiff in Hynix Semiconductor.
 
143
¶41 Interestingly, the court began its analysis of the issue of equitable relief as follows: 
“Like cases should be decided alike, and centuries of equity practice shepherd this court’s 
exercise of its power to enjoin infringement.”
  In that 
case, Rambus held a patent on certain dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”) 
interface technology.  The patent was found valid and infringed so Rambus moved for 
injunctive relief.  Hynix, the infringer, derived its revenue from the manufacture and sale 
of DRAM, not merely a small component of the patented technology.  Rambus, however, 
derived its revenues solely from licensing DRAM.  The court discussed at length a 
multitude of details regarding the nature of the patented technology.  Ultimately, it 
concluded that Rambus failed to prove that it would suffer irreparable harm without the 
injunction. 
144  When it discussed the issue of 
irreparable harm, the court found that there was real future harm to Rambus in the battle 
over the next memory interface standard; however, the court found that the “weight of 
such harm is small.”145
 
136 Advanced Cardiovascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (“A strong public interest supports a broad choice 
of drug-eluting stents, even though no published study proves the superiority of either [of the available 
products].” (quoting Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 99 F. App’x 928, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
137 Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Del. 2009) (denying permanent 
injunction). 
138 See Telcordia Techs., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (injunction denied); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 579 F. 
Supp. 2d 554(injunction denied); IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007) 
(injunction denied); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Del. 2007) (injunction denied), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
139 Telcordia Techs., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 747. 
140 Id. at 747-48 (quoting IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D. Del. 2007)). 
141 Id. at 747. 
142 Id. at 748. 
143 Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (injunction denied). 
144 Id. at 966. 
145 Id. at 981. 
  The court then asked whether that harm was compensable by 
money damages and concluded that it was not: “When Rambus loses a design win to an 
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infringing alternative, its realistic alternative is to license its patents to the users of the 
infringing standard.  While Rambus may collect royalties from such licensing, Rambus is 
shut out of the ‘innovation loop.’”146  Finally, discussing the issue of loss of market share, 
the court acknowledged that Rambus would suffer loss of goodwill in the event that an 
injunction did not issue.  The court then discussed Rambus’s claim that it would also 
suffer irreparable harm in the form of diminished royalties, harm to research and 
development and damage to its image as an innovator.  It acknowledged that “Rambus’s 
argument has initial appeal, and it was adopted to support an injunction in 
Commonwealth Scientific,”147 but the court distinguished Commonwealth Scientific and 
Broadcom and ultimately concluded that no injunction should issue.148
¶42 The key to this decision may be in the court’s analysis of the balance of hardships.  
“[B]y the time Hynix became aware of Rambus’s asserted patents, Rambus’s 
technologies were entrenched in the industry standard DRAM interface. . . .  Th[is] lock-
in resulted in large part because Rambus did not disclose and, in fact, did not obtain the 
patents in suit until its efforts to establish RDRAM as the industry standard faltered and 
the JEDEC standards had enjoyed nearly five years of success.”
 
149
V. MOST COURTS IN 2009, RELYING ON AN EXPANDING DEFINITION OF “COMPETITION 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES,” IMPOSE A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST PATENT 
INFRINGERS, SIGNALING A SHIFT BACK TO PRE-EBAY TREATMENT OF PERMANENT 
INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
 
¶43 Prior to the Supreme Court’s eBay decision there was a “general rule that courts 
will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances.”150
¶44 The result was an immediate spike in the number of patent cases in which requests 
for injunctive relief were denied.  Those denials were frequently based on the patent 
holder’s inability to demonstrate the first two factors of the test, irreparable harm and no 
adequate remedy at law.  Post-eBay courts, obligated to apply the four-factor test, often 
evaluated the first and second factors based on the nature of the competition between the 
parties.  Despite the significance of inter-party competition on the outcome of post-eBay 
cases there is no universally accepted description of what constitutes “competition 
between the parties.” 
  With its eBay decision, the Supreme Court rejected that principle and 
held that the proper test for determining whether to impose an injunction against a patent 
infringer is the standard four-factor test for imposing equitable relief. 
¶45 In the first year following eBay, the definition of “competition between the parties” 
was narrow.  Parties were described as competitors only when they were in direct 
competition (i.e., had the same customers and the sale of products to one party would 
have a negative impact on the sale of products to the other party).151
 
146Id. 
147Id. at 983. 
148 Id. at 969-70 (discussing Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
149 Hynix Semiconductor, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85. 
150 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
  Evidence of 
151 See Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (injunction 
granted); Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86990 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (same) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 207 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 
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competition, and thereby irreparable harm, in those early cases was limited to loss of 
market share or the like: price erosion, lost profits, loss of brand name recognition, or loss 
of goodwill.152  Notably, when direct competition existed between the parties, courts gave 
the inadequate remedies at law prong an expansive scope, including the loss of the right 
to exclude and the inability to calculate future profits.153
¶46 Since the first year post-eBay the scope of what constitutes competition between 
the parties has expanded.  As a direct result of those changes, there has been a 
corresponding expansion in the scope of what constitutes irreparable harm.  In the second 
year following eBay, a Texas District Court granted an injunction in favor of a non-
practicing entity.
 
154  Later, a California court granted an injunction based on market 
competition, not just product competition,155 specifically holding, “one need not 
necessarily be a direct competitor in order to secure an injunction.”156  The District Court 
in Oregon granted an injunction to a patent holder that was one of a number of 
competitors in a particular market and had licensed the patented technology to other 
competitors.157
¶47 In the third year post-eBay, the definition of “competitor” expanded further.  In the 
District of Delaware, a court granted the patent holder a permanent injunction although it 




2008) (vacating and remanding on the issue of claim construction); Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 
2006) (injunction granted); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 70263 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006) (same); Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-
333-TJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006) (same); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar 
Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 6641 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming injunction); Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., No. 1:05-
CV-1071-ODE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96872 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2007) (injunction granted); rev’d, 516 
F.3d 1361(Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversing and remanding on validity); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation 
Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 2-04-CV-32, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25948 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007) (injunction 
granted), vacated, 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating and remanding on infringement); MGM Well 
Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (injunction granted), aff’d, 264 
F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401 (N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(same). 
152 See cases listed in note 151, supra. 
153 Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007) (injunction granted; loss 
of the right to exclude); MGM Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D. Tex. 
2007) (injunction granted), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., 
No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006) (same; future damages 
cannot be calculated with precision, so monetary damages are an inadequate remedy); Smith & Nephew, 
Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (injunction granted; inability to calculate 
future damages); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (injunction granted); Black & Decker Inc. v. 
Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86990 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (same) 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 207 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2008) (vacating and remanding 
on the issue of claim construction). 
154 See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 
(E.D. Tex. 2007). 
155 See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. SACV 05-467 JVS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 31, 2007 (injunction granted); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. SACV 05-0467-JVS, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105232 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2008) (injunction granted). 
156 Broadcom Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *5-27. 
157 Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (permanent injunction affirmed). 
158 See Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Del. 2008). 
  In so 
doing, the court relied in part on the fact that the parties were competitors at the market 
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level (rather than at the product level).  In the Northern District of Georgia, a permanent 
injunction against a patent infringer was granted despite the fact that the corporate 
defendant was dissolved and its principal was incarcerated.  The court noted that 
“[e]specially when an infringing company is not actively selling the offending product, 
the harm to a patent-holder may seem esoteric.”159  Nonetheless, the court considered the 
parties competitors and granted the request for an injunction.  The District Court in New 
Jersey found irreparable harm although the patent holder had ceased operating and was in 
the process of liquidating its assets through a bankruptcy proceeding.  It granted the 
injunction recognizing that in order for the patent holder to maximize the value of the 
patent, there would have to be an injunction against infringement.160
¶48 The District Court in the Eastern District of Texas, in a decision regarding a 
requested stay of the proceedings, recently confirmed its view that patent holders that are 
also non-practicing entities may be entitled to permanent injunctive relief.
  
161
¶49 The eBay decision has had a significant impact on the analytical process courts use 
to determine whether a patent holder is entitled to an injunction.  Every post-eBay case to 
consider a request for equitable relief contains an evaluation of the facts of the case in 
view of each of the four elements of the traditional four-factor test for equitable relief.  If 
such an analysis is not present and an appeal is taken, the Federal Circuit is likely to 
remand the case for further proceedings.  However, the eBay decision has not had a 
significant and lasting impact on the outcome of those decisions.  A close analysis of the 
post-eBay cases reveals that in most jurisdictions, courts have returned to the pre-eBay 
practice of generally granting injunctions against patent infringers.  In the first year after 
the eBay decision, there was a noticeable spike in the number of cases denying injunctive 
relief.  Those decisions, relying on a narrow definition of competition between the 
parties, often found that the patent holder had failed to demonstrate that it would suffer 
irreparable harm unless an injunction issued.  In recent years, the scope of what courts 
find constitutes competition between the parties and thereby irreparable harm, has 
expanded.  As a result, the number of cases in which a patent holder is denied permanent 
injunctive relief has diminished.  Today, in most jurisdictions, proof of patent 
infringement will generally, absent a compelling public interest concern, result in the 
imposition of a permanent injunction against the infringer. 
 
 
159 Emory Univ. v. Nova BioGenetics, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0141-TWT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57642, at 
*12-13 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2008) (injunction granted). 
160 Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at *32 
(D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2009) (granting permanent injunction). 
161 BarTex Research, LLC v. FedEx Corp., 611 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (E.D. Tex Apr. 20, 2009) (“BarTex 
may still be entitled to a permanent injunction, even though it does not practice its patent”). 
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Chart of Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Patent Cases 
 
01/2006 02/2006 03/2006 04/2006 05/2006 06/2006 07/2006 08/2006 09/2006 10/2006 11/2006 12/2006 
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Cases are listed by the date of the district court decision unless the decision was reversed on appeal and the reversal was based on the issue of equitable relief. In that situation, the 
case is listed by the date of the appellate court decision. The cases listed in parentheses are ones in which the request for injunctive relief was denied. 
*Injunction denied based on the courts determination that there was no likelihood of future infringement. 
** Injunction denied without prejudice, so not a final order. Decided by Judge Sue Robinson, District of Delaware. 
*** Injunction denied based on the fact that the jury’s royalty award included a market entry fee.
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i eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
ii z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (permanent injunction denied), 
aff’d, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
iii Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 
2006) (permanent injunction denied), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(issue on appeal was validity and infringement). 
iv Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669 (W.D. 
Okla. July 27, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
v KEG Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (consent order for permanent 
injunction entered July 24, 2006). 
vi Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 
16, 2006) (permanent injunction denied), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
vii Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., No. 01-00578, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59212 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 
22, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
viii Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg. Inc., No. 04-5120 (DWF/RLE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 23, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
ix Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485 ERW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60575 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 25, 2006) (permanent injunction granted), aff’d, 523 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
x TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (permanent injunction 
granted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (injunction affirmed). 
xi Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
xii Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) 
(permanent injunction denied). 
xiii 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781 (JRT/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70263 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
xiv Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. CV-96-5658 (CPS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73366 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
28, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
xv Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (WD. Tenn. 2006) (permanent 
injunction granted), appeal dismissed, 269 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
xvi Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86990 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (permanent injunctin granted), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 260 F. App’x 
284 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacated and remanded on the issue of claim construction). 
xvii Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93408 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
xviii Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453, at *12-14 
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006) (permanent injunction granted). 
xix Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
4, 2007) (permanent injunction denied), rev’d, No. 02-73543, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77728 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 19, 2007), rev’d on the issue of infringement, 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
xx MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 258 F. App’x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirmed except to the 
extent that injunction prohibited non-infringing sales). 
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xxi IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007) (permanent injunction denied). 
xxii Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-1071-ODE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96872 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2007) (permanent injunction granted), rev’d and remanded, 516 F.3d 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
xxiii Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted). 
xxiv O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 2-04-CV-32 (TJW), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25948 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007) (permanent injunction granted), vacated and remanded, 521 F.3d 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (jury verdict vacated and case remanded on the issue of infringement). 
xxv Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., Nos. 04-1689, 06-757, 06-5166, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19494 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007) (permanent injunction granted), aff’d, 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
xxvi Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Del. 2007) (permanent injunction denied), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (on appeal patent holder agreed to withdraw 
request for injunctive relief). 
xxvii Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. SA CV 03-242 DOC (ANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96487 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 13, 2007) (permanent injunction granted), rev’d, 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (permanent 
injunction dissolved). 
xxviii MGM Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 378-79 (S.D. Tex. 2007) 
(permanent injunction granted), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
xxix 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Secs., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part by, 539 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed on the 
issue of infringement and permanent injunction vacated). 
xxx Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 
2007) (permanent injunction granted). 
xxxi Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43107 (E.D. Tex. 
June 14, 2007) (permanent injunction granted), appealed dismissed, 253 F. App’x 25 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (joint 
motion). 
xxxii Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted), aff’d, 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
xxxiii Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted), rev’d and vacated, 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed and vacated on validity and 
infringement). 
xxxiv Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 513 F. Supp 2d 578 (D. Md. 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted), rev’d and remanded, 543 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversed and remanded on the issue of 
infringement). 
xxxv Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co., 509 F. Supp. 2d 795 (D. Minn. 2007) (permanent injunction 
granted). 
xxxvi Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70776 
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2007) (permanent injunction granted). 
xxxvii Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming injunction 
as to certain claims and reversing injunction as to certain claims). 
xxxviii Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D. Del. 2007) (permanent 
injunction granted). 
xxxix Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’g Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 
04-CV-513-BR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86866 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007) (permanent injunction granted). 
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xl Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No 04-0336, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008) 
(permanent injunction denied). 
xli Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3148 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 
2007) (permanent injunction granted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 512 F.3d 1363, (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (injunction vacated and case remanded for setting of compulsory license). 
xlii Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No. 06-0162 MMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12183 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (permanent injunction denied). 
xliii Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No.: SACV 05-467 JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007) (district courts reasoning for granting permanent injunction); Broadcom Corp. v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., No. SACV05-0467-JVS (RNBx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105232 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 
2008) (order granting permanent injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (permanent injunction partially affirmed). 
xliv Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-463, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30338 (E.D. Tex. 
Apr. 11, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
xlv Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
79689 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
xlvi Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86953 (N.D. Ill. May 
22, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
xlvii TruePosition v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008) (permanent injunction granted), 
amended by No. 05-747-SLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9946 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2009) (court reconsidered 
amount of pre- and post-judgment interest). 
xlviii Emory Univ. v. Nova BioGenetics, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0141-TWT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57642 (N.D. 
Ga. July 24, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
xlix Mannatech, Inc. v. Glycoproducts Int’l, Inc., No. 3-06-CV-0471-BD, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52537 
(N.D. Tex. July 9, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
l Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008) 
(permanent injunction denied). 
li Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. 05-12237-WGY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77343 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 2, 2008) (permanent injunction granted), aff’d, 296 F. App’x 69 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
lii Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, No. 02-1694 GMS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87623 (D. Del. Oct. 29, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
liii Sensormatic Elecs. Corp. v. Tag Co. US, LLC, No. 06-81105-CIV-HURLEY/HOPKINS, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 102690 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
liv Extreme Networks, Inc. v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 07-cv-229-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88540 
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
lv Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 02-0790 SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98939 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 25, 2008) (permanent injunction denied). 
lvi Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Del. 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
lvii Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 04-1371-JJF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100539 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2008) (permanent injunction granted). 
lviii U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., Ltd., 03 Civ. 0172 (PKC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6869 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) (permanent injunction granted). 
lix Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Del. 2009) (permanent injunction denied). 
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lx Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (permanent 
injunction granted). 
lxi Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13530 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (permanent injunction denied). 
lxii Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172 (JAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531 
(D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2009) (permanent injunction granted). 
lxiii Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Res., Nos. 05-00679-BMK, 05-00787-BMK, 06-00182-BMK, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26216 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2009) (permanent injunction granted). 
lxiv Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. CV-03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31328 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009) (permanent injunction denied). 
lxv Mass Engineered Design, Inc., v. Ergotron, Inc., No. 2:06 CV 272, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34173 (E.D. 
Tex. April 17, 2009) (permanent injunction granted). 
lxvi Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., No. 05-CV-831, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39189 (D. Minn., May 29, 2007) 
(permanent injunction denied), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (denial of permanent injunction vacated and remanded). 
lxvii Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 702 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
(permanent injunction granted). 
lxviii i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113,  2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 
2009) (permanent injunction granted). 
lxix Finjan Software, Ltd., v. Secure Computing Corp., No. 06-369 (GMS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72825 
(D. Del. Aug. 18, 2009) (permanent injunction granted). 
